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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions of my Government, I have the honour to reiterate the full support of the Republic of Croatia for the enforcement of Security Council resolution 816 (1993).

In accordance with paragraph 7 of the said resolution, I have the honour to inform you of the actions undertaken by the Government of the Republic of Croatia, upon requests of the Member States participating in the authorized operation.

The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Budapest, acting on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on 8 April 1993 requested the Republic of Croatia the use of its airspace for aircraft from the respective Air Forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Republic of France and the Kingdom of the Netherlands - in order to enable the implementation of resolution 816 (1993). The request was granted on 9 April 1993; consequently, the Republic of Croatia is supporting the NATO action by providing the use of its airspace.

Pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 816 (1993), the Government of the Republic of Croatia, in order to ease and facilitate the complete implementation of the resolution, offers the use of the airfields of Zadar and Dubrovnik and the full logistical support available (fuel, food, accommodation, facilities). In the case of emergency or vis major, when the security of the planes or the personnel would be endangered, all the assistance and the resources will immediately be made available, and all the airfields on the territory of the Republic of Croatia could be used.

In order to prevent any possible mishaps or threat to the security of the international or domestic commercial and passenger air traffic, in the Croatian airspace, it is our wish to more precisely define the above general permission.

The Croatian Government is deeply concerned at this time - due to the presence of large numbers of military aircraft undertaking a combat surveillance and interception operation in the vicinity of the airspace of the Republic of Croatia and overflying it, due to the particular geographical shape of Croatia and due to the position of the civilian air-corridors (ATC routes) - that the safety of commercial passenger air-traffic could be endangered.

Already on several occasions "near mid-air encounters" with passenger aircraft have been reported when the NATO combat aircraft were crossing the ATC airways into Split and Dubrovnik civilian airport, causing concern among the passengers, crew members and ground air-traffic controller personnel. This has led to consideration of temporarily closing the respective airports to all traffic, until a workable technical solution can be found.

In order to facilitate the communication between the NATO authorities acting under the authorization given in resolution 816 (1993), and the relevant civilian and military authorities of the Republic of Croatia, my Government invites the appointment of two military liaison Air Force officers to serve in air control centres in Zagreb and Split, respectively. At the same time, and pending the previous political decision by the participating Member States, it announces its readiness to appoint a liaison Air Force officer to serve in the tactical headquarters of the operation. It is our belief that in the described manner the necessary flow of the essential traffic information, both on the activities of the Croatian civilian and military traffic and of the overflight of NATO combat aircraft over the airspace of the Republic of Croatia - especially of the intercepting and crossing of the ATC airways and NATO combat aircraft flying paths, would be greatly facilitated and eased.

I would ask for your kind assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25613
19 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) and paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 780 (1992), I have the honour to submit to you information relating to violations of humanitarian law and human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the information provided in the annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter HOHENFELLNER
Ambassador

Annex

Republic of Austria
Federal Ministry of the Interior

Report
on the Results of Interviews with War Refugees Staying in Austria on Violations of Humanitarian International Law and of Human Rights in Former Yugoslavia

Vienna, February 1993

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I. The situation

On 6 October 1992, the UN Security Council, noting reports on mass executions and ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia, asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to set up an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse such reports. At the same time, the Security Council asked States, the appropriate agencies of the United Nations and other organisations to make information on violations of humanitarian international law in former Yugoslavia available to the Commission. When adopting this Resolution, the Security Council had before it Resolution No. 771, which only called for the collection of such information, the report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, on the human rights situation in former Yugoslavia, and an article published in "New York Newsday" on 23 August 1992 entitled "Rape by Command: Serbian Terror Against Bosnian Women".

II. Collection of data concerning crimes against humanity in former Yugoslavia

Under the Resolution mentioned above, the Federal Ministry of the Interior has conducted interviews with those persons having fled to Austria who were either themselves victims of physical or psychological brutality or, as eyewitnesses, are able to testify to violations of human rights in the areas occupied by Serbs.

The immediate occasion for conducting the interviews was the acceptance by Austria of 171 prisoners of war who had been moved from TRNOPOLJE camp to Croatia through the intercession of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

III. Interviews

3.1. General

At the request of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Commissioners for Refugees of the Austrian Federal States supplied the names of those persons in their care who were prepared to furnish the interviewers with relevant information. The prisoners of war who were in Federal care were questioned at the Traiskirchen Refugee Centre. A total of 17 persons were interviewed: 3 in Vienna, 7 at Traiskirchen and 7 in Carinthia. Most of those interviewed come from the north-eastern parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The following data were obtained: precise personal data; time and place of the violation of human rights; description of the violation; and the names of the persons who committed these crimes against humanity. On the basis of the facts of each incident, the cases were assigned to five categories, although it was not possible to draw clear-cut lines because of the multiple and partly overlapping elements of these crimes against humanity:

1) Mass executions (4 witnesses);
2) Torture and ill-treatment (6 victims);
3) Rape (3 victims);

4) Arbitrary shootings and massacres (2 witnesses);
5) Ethnic cleansing (1 victim, 1 witness).

In view of the requirements of Austrian data protection legislation, this report was written in two parts. Its first part contains a description of the situation based on the author's interviews with war refugees living in Austria. The second part of the report contains the personal data of those who testified and information on the persons named by them who are under suspicion of having committed war crimes.

With the code numbers assigned in the first part of the report, the informant's identity can be established if necessary.

3.2.1. Mass executions

3.2.1.1. KEROTERM camp

Code No. ALK1

The camp is 10 kilometres from HAMBARINE and consists of four halls. This witness was detained from 20 July to 5 August 1992 at the camp, which housed about 1,700 persons at the time. The witness was arrested by Serb soldiers on 20 July together with other inhabitants of his village, and was taken to the camp. He was accommodated in Hall 3 with about 350 - 400 men (10 by 10 metres).

The witness states:

Towards the evening of 24 July 1992, the windows and doors of the hall were closed. The prisoners were given containers with drinking water. Apparently the water was poisoned because those prisoners who drank water fainted, which is why unrest unrose in the hall. The prisoners started to shout and loudly expressed their anger. Shortly thereafter (at about 10.00 p.m.) the doors were opened and about 15 soldiers entered the hall. /...

They hit with their rifle butts at the prisoners sitting or standing in the immediate vicinity of the door. A short time later, the soldiers started to shoot at the prisoners at random. The witness threw himself to the ground and pretended to be dead. The shooting lasted for about 15 minutes. Then the soldiers closed the door again, leaving the injured and dead in the hall. On the next morning, the dead were loaded on to several lorries and the injured were taken to the courtyard. At first it was said that a doctor would treat the injured. After two hours, the injured were also loaded on to lorries by some prisoners.

On 26 July 1992 at about 6 a.m., 5 or 6 soldiers came into the hall and selected about 50 prisoners. The soldiers ordered them to stand directly in front of the hall and then shot at the prisoners. Those who were not dead at once were executed by single shots. Then 10 prisoners were brought from the hall who were ordered to load the dead bodies on a lorry. These prisoners were also taken away in that lorry. The witness does not know anything about the fate of these prisoners. He assumes that these persons were also shot to prevent them from giving away the place where the dead bodies were buried. On the same day, the prisoners were ordered to clean the halls spattered with blood. The courtyard was cleaned with water hoses. The reason was said to be that a commission or delegation was coming to inspect the camp. Reportedly the camp was really inspected on 5 August 1992, which is why the prisoners were transferred to TRNOPOLJE camp beforehand. The witness remained in the latter camp until 1 October 1992 and was then with other prisoners transferred to KARLOVAC (50 km from ZAGREB).

The witness was told that according to the testimony of other persons the events described had taken place on 20 July and 23 July 1992, respectively. The witness insisted that the poisoning of the water had taken place on 24 July and the mass execution in front of the hall on 26 July 1992. He gave the names of persons who took part in the shooting on 26 July 1992.

The witness says that in the camp at TRNOPOLJE only his watch was taken from him. He states that some prisoners were beaten and ill-treated in that camp. In that camp, relatives were allowed to visit the prisoners.

Code No. ALK2

This witness was at the above-mentioned prison camp from 9 July to 9 August 1992. Reportedly it is a fairly new ceramics factory which closed due to the fighting. The witness was detained in Hall 3 until 22 July 1992 and then in Hall 2, where there were about 520 prisoners. The witness made precise statements about the numerous cases of ill-treatment and prisoners being shot dead, which agree with the statements of the first witness according to whom the mass executions in Hall 3 took place after witness ALK2 was transferred to Hall 2.

3.2.1.2. BROD/FOCA

Code No. ABF1

This witness saw towards the end of June (between 20 and 30 June 1992) civilians (men) from the surrounding villages being taken to a bridge by soldiers and being thrown into the river DRINA after having been shot dead.

The witness himself lived in the town of BROD (4 km from the town of FOCA). On 8 April 1992, the Serbs attacked FOCA. Thereupon the witness hid in a house at ZUBOVICE. After three days, he went to a Serbian friend who hid him in his house located about 100 metres from a bridge across the river DRINA (20 m). From the attic of the house he was able to see everything that happened on the bridge.

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In the late afternoon of the first day, about 20 - 30 persons were walked from BROD to the bridge. The hands of the prisoners were tied to their backs. They were accompanied by about 30 - 50 soldiers. The prisoners stood on the bridge for about an hour. During that time, they were insulted and beaten with rifle butts by the soldiers. Then the soldiers started to shoot at the prisoners with their automatic weapons. Afterwards the dead bodies were thrown into the river from the bridge.

Reportedly these dead bodies were pulled out of the river at GORAZDE, which was controlled by the Moslems, and after their identification by residents of Brod who had fled to GORAZDE they were buried. This report was broadcast by Radio-SARAJEVO.

Before dusk on the second day, about 50 - 70 prisoners from TRNOVACE (2 km from BROD) and TRBUSCE (4 - 5 km from BROD) were brought to the bridge in a lorry. Among them were some members of the BECKOVIC family whom the witness knew personally. Three to five prisoners were bound to each other with their hands on their backs. At nightfall, the prisoners were shot by about 50 - 60 soldiers wearing different uniforms of the Yugoslav Federal Army and of the chetniks. Then the dead bodies were thrown into the river. Since next to the bridge there were the remains of an old bridge from the Second World War, some of the dead bodies which were bound to each other were caught in these remains. On the following day, these corpses were mangled by hand grenades so that the water could float them away in the end.

Around midnight of the third day, again prisoners were brought to the bridge in lorries from MILJEVINA (11 km from BROD); because of the darkness, the witness cannot make any statements about their number. Shortly after their arrival, the prisoners were shot and their dead bodies were thrown into the river. Because of the frequency with which the impact of the corpses on the surface of the water could be heard, the witness assumes that there must have been many corpses. On the following day,

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tank trucks drove up to the bridge; the bloodstains were washed off. This process was repeated on several days because the bloodstains could not be washed off at once. The witness thinks that one could still find traces of blood on that bridge today.

The witness remained in his Serbian friend's house until 2 July 1992; with his friend's help, he was able to get an exit permit with which he was able to flee via NOVIPAZAR to SKOPJE. After a two-month stay in Macedonia, the witness came to Austria on 9 September 1992.

The witness names persons from his village who were present at the executions.

3.2.1.3. GREAT ZVORNIK

Code No. ABGZ1

The witness comes from this area. In his first interview with the US diplomat, he stated that massacres of children and mass executions of Moslem patients had taken place at the local hospital.

On Monday, 22 June 1992, the witness saw from a house located in SMALL ZVORNIK (Serbia) that Serb soldiers in GREAT ZVORNIK (Bosnia) were preventing civilians from crossing the river DRINA. He saw bulldozers digging out earth. Reportedly corpses from FOCA were to be buried there. These graves were dug in the place where previously the Moslem and Jewish cemeteries had been located.

On 8 April 1992, Serb soldiers occupied the hospital where the witness was working as an X-ray assistant. Soon after the occupation, the witness was sent home. But after the soldiers could not find suitable personnel for the X-ray department, he was called back to work. The witness's statements as to when /...

the massacre of children took place are contradictory, he says it was on a Wednesday or Thursday at 10.00 a.m.(21 May 1992?). The witness was in the children's ward on the second floor of the hospital where about 17 children aged from one to 12 years were accommodated. The soldiers went into the rooms and maltreated the children brutally. They broke their arms and legs and flung small children through the corridors. He is sure that many children lost their lives.

A little later, the personnel was ordered to take the Moslem patients from their rooms; they were forced to stand along the outer wall of the building. The personnel had to watch the patients being shot by the soldiers. The witness was standing beside the main entrance of the Diagnostic Department, about 50 metres from the place of execution. As to the number of persons executed, he cannot give precise information. Next to the witness his Serbian subordinate was standing, but he can hardly be named as a witness because, given his nationality, he would not be prepared to testify about the events.

3.2.2. Torture and ill-treatment

3.2.2.1. BATKOVCI camp

Code No. BB1

This witness comes from GREAT ZVORNIK and was himself a victim of physical ill-treatment. He was detained in the camp at BATKOVCI (see the ICRC certificate of 8 December 1992) and he is prepared to repeat his testimony before a public body.

The witness was arrested by chetniks on 14 May 1992 at 5.30 p.m. at BIJELINA (between SMALL ZVORNIK and GREAT ZVORNIK). The witness was handcuffed and taken to a car with a pistol being held to his temple. He was accused of having hidden explosives in his house, which, however, was not true. He was taken to a

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kindergarten in the centre of the town of GREAT ZVORNIK, where he was beaten for hours by a policeman with a truncheon.

Then he was taken to the ALOHOS textile plant at GREAT ZVORNIK, where the crisis staff of the Serbs was in session at the outbreak of the war. The witness was beaten by three soldiers in the night from 16 to 17 May 1992 from 8.00 p.m. to 4.00 a.m.in a changing room with toilets. He had to stand at the wall with raised hands. The soldiers beat him with rifle butts and fists in the face, which led to a fracture of the upper jaw (medical report from TUZLA hospital of 13 October 1992). The witness was unable to take solid food for 20 days. He had to wipe off his own blood from the floor.

Because the witness had told a soldier whose brother had worked under him in a mine, that he was afraid to be killed, the soldier remained in the textile plant in order to protect him against ill-treatment. The witness was transferred to a court building on 20 May 1992 at 11.00 a.m.This building consisted of 4 rooms; in each room about 60 persons were being held. The witness was beaten every day by soldiers who did not belong to the guard personnel. The soldiers would enter the room and order the prisoners present to remain standing with their hands on their backs and their heads bent. The persons who were to be beaten were ordered to kneel down with bent heads. These prisoners received kicks against their backs and kidneys. In a room next door, a sixty-year-old man suffering from a kidney complaint reportedly died as a result of such ill-treatment.

On 4 June 1992, the witness was transferred to a neighbouring house with other prisoners, because the court building was said to be required to accommodate 120 prisoners, among them 20 seriously injured people from the culture centre at CELOPEK where, so they heard, about 30 persons were being killed every day. On the ground floor of the neighbouring house, the women prisoners were accommodated. On the first floor, there were two rooms; in the first, 60 persons were held, in the second, 10; /...

there the prisoners were beaten. The torturers wore uniforms of the Mirko JOVIC group (i.e. White Eagle) and of the SESELJ group.

The JOVIC group cut crosses in the foreheads of ten prisoners. The SESELJ group used a different method of torture. They placed a wire around the prisoners' throats and choked them until they lost consciousness. Then they beat them on the head with a truncheon until they regained consciousness. This torture was applied from 4 June to 15 July 1992.

A prisoner named SEJFO (aged about 35) was tortured in the garage of the house. The witness was able to observe from a window opposite the garage how three soldiers beat the prisoner with iron bars until he collapsed dead. The corpse was then taken away in the boot of a Mercedes.

On 15 July 1992 at about 2.00 p.m., the male prisoners from the court building and the neighbouring house (except the seriously injured) were transferred in buses to BATKOVIC camp. Shortly after their arrival, the prisoners were beaten by soldiers with rifle butts, truncheons and fists. In the hall where the witness was held, there were about 1,000 persons. The soldiers rained blows on the prisoners again and again. He himself did not see the soldiers beating the prisoners, but he could see their dead bodies on the next day which were lying on the ground in the courtyard wrapped in a piece of cloth. This kind of beating was mostly administered in the evening. At that time, prisoners with their hands on the back of their necks and their heads bent had to be present when the soldiers ill-treated other prisoners picked from the crowd at random.

He says that on one evening at about 6 p.m. four new prisoners were brought into the camp. In the courtyard, they were beaten by four soldiers. Two prisoners reached the hall with their last ounce of strength, the two others remained lying on the ground, so they were carried into the hall by the soldiers. /...

Blood was flowing from the ears of one of the two prisoners, because of his wounds he did not recognise his father who was also being held in the hall. The other young prisoner who had been carried into the hall later died from his injuries. That was in early September 1992.

The witness states that he was only beaten after his arrival at the camp. From 15 July to 1 October 1992 he himself saw 15 dead bodies which were taken away from the camp.

To the question whether enough food was available there, he replied that he had lost 25 kg in weight during his imprisonment. The witness gave the names of two soldiers who ill-treated the prisoners.

Code No. BB2

This witness lived in the town of BREZOVO POLJE, which was attacked by Serb forces on 17 June 1992. After the occupation of the town, the men were taken first to a gymnasium and later to the port of BRCKO, and the women with their children were taken to ORASJE LONCARI (12 km from BRCKO). The witness reports that shortly after their arrival three chetniks came to the gymnasium (where about 1,000 peopole were being held) and asked for prisoners of Albanian descent. 10 - 15 persons answered. Some did not answer for fear. Some were taken out of the mass of prisoners by soldiers. Shortly thereafter the soldiers began to beat the Albanians. The right ear of one young Albanian whom the witness knew, was cut off with a knife. The young man collapsed and was in a coma for ten days. During the witness's 23-day imprisonment, chetniks came into the hall again and again and ill-treated the prisoners.

On 9 July 1992, the prisoners were transferred from that gymnasium to the camp of BATKOVICI. The witness says that three chetniks entered the bus before the prisoners got off, and

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saying that "he had no chance and the camp was the last stop for him" hit the witness, who was sitting in the first row, with a truncheon on the head because he had dared to look one of the soldiers in the eye. After they got off the bus, the men had to stand with raised hands facing the wall. Their personal effects were taken from the prisoners. On their march to the storehouse, the prisoners were beaten by soldiers and the witness was repeatedly kicked. In the hall, the prisoners were again ordered to stand with raised hands facing the wall. The prisoners were then beaten by the soldiers for an hour. The witness was detained in this camp until 23 October 1992.

During his imprisonment, the prisoners were ill-treated again and again. During that time, the witness saw about 20 prisoners die from their injuries after beatings. Among them were a prisoner named Ferid ZECEVIC, a café owner, and his friend APAKA (first name unknown), who died from their injuries in early September 1992. Many prisoners also died in the camp because of lack of medical care.

The witness gives the names of several Serb soldiers responsible for ill-treating prisoners.

Code No. BB3

The witness was detained in the above-mentioned camp from 2 July to 5 December 1992 (see the ICRC certificate of 15 December 1992). The witness confirmed the above witness's testimony that there was repeated ill-treatment of prisoners by Serb soldiers. In addition, the witness reports that before his arrest on 22 June 1992, two old women standing at the doors of their houses were shot dead by Serbian irregulars with machine-guns on 16 June 1992 in a forest near KORAJ (25 km from BRCKO). The witness, who was hiding behind some bushes, was able to see this incident from a distance of about 50 metres.

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3.2.2.2. BRCKO

Code No. BBR4

On 30 April, the Serbs attacked the town of BRCKO. Two bridges across the river SAVA (the boundary between Bosnia and Croatia) were blown up. The witness was arrested by the ARKAN group on 4 May 1992 at 9.00 a.m.at his house in BRCKO because of his Moslem descent. The witness was first taken with other civilians to a barracks in BRCKO, where the men were separated from the women. The women and children (about 150 persons) were taken in buses to BREZOVO POLJE (18 km from BRCKO) and the men (about 150) were taken to the LASER camp, a garage which had formerly belonged to a travel agency named LASER. The guard consisted of soldiers from the town of BRCKO. There was little to eat and the prisoners had to sleep on the floor.

On 7 May 1992, the witness saw three Serb soldiers picking out a neighbour of his named KEMO, a member of the organisation STRANKA DEMOKRATESKE AKTIE (Party of Democratic Action), from the among the other prisoners and beating him up. He died on the same evening.

On 8 May 1992, the witness was transferred with other prisoners from the LASER camp to the camp of LUKA-BRCKO (a former warehouse) where there were already about 100 prisoners. The men over 60 were taken to the village of CELIC (20 km from BRCKO). There, first of all, the prisoners were deprived of their personal effects. The witness reports how the soldiers insulted and beat the prisoners. On that night, an officer of the Serb army, Goran JELISIC, came to the camp with two other soldiers and picked about 10 people from the crowd. Then the soldiers beat the prisoners with rubber truncheons and kicked them with their feet.

On the next day, a Serbian officer came, selected about 15 prisoners and took them to another building, where they were /...

beaten and ill-treated. After that, the prisoners returned to the hall of the warehouse. On the same day, Goran JELISIC came back to the camp with the officer just mentioned and picked specifically two prisoners from the crowd, the brothers HASANOVIC, who came from GLOD (near ZVORNIK, 80 km from BRCKO). They were beaten up brutally. Then they were shot by the two Serbs in front of the other prisoners. Their corpses were then taken away by other soldiers in a car. The witness states that the dead bodies were taken to the incineration plant for animal carcasses in BRCKO.

After this incident, about two hours later, Goran JELISIC came back to the hall with a man aged about 50 who was holding his right ear in his hand. He was a Croat. JELISIC ordered the prisoners to shoot the Croat. When none of the prisoners volunteered, a Serb soldier declared himself ready to do it. He then shot the Croat with his rifle. On that day, a young prisoner was also called out by Goran JELISIC and shot dead after being ill-treated.

During that day, the camp commanders called about 40 prisoners by name to the camp office where they were handed discharge papers of passes. Although the witness had not been called, a Serb soldier from BRCKO who knew him helped him to get a discharge paper.

While the witness was waiting for his pass, he could see a young married couple, who had been brought to the camp shortly earlier and whose hands had been tied to their backs, being beaten by Goran JELISIC and another Serb soldier. The couple were ordered to kneel down and eat grass. The witness has no information about the further fate of that couple.

After his release, the witness went to his parents' home, where he stayed until 13 July 1992. When the Serbs again started to arrest Moslem and Croat men, he decided to leave BRCKO. Another Serbian friend of his, a former fellow worker, helped him at /...

the local police station to get another discharge document or pass. In this pass, Austria was mentioned as his destination. On 14 July 1992, the witness left BRCKO and went to BJELJINA (on the border between Bosnia and Serbia) where he was, however, sent back to BJELJINA [sic] by the military police, until finally a Serbian family helped him to travel to Austria on 2 and 3 September 1992.

Code No. BBR5

This witness was detained from 17 June to 9 July 1992 in a hall at the port of BRCKO. In that hall, about 800 - 900 persons were imprisoned. The witness tells how the right ear of young Albanian accused of raping a Serbian woman was cut off. The witness also says that the Serb soldiers constantly ill-treated the prisoners.

The witness was transferred to BATKOVIC prison camp on 9 July. He was released from that camp at the end of December 1992 (ICRC identity card No. 240918). The witness reports that the prisoners at their arrival were received with blows and kicks by the soldiers present there. On that occasion the witness was hit on the head with a rifle butt so hard that he suffered a severe contusion the scars of which are still visible today.

The witness reports that prisoners were ill-treated again and again during his imprisonment. During that time, the witness saw a prisoner named Ferid ZECEVIC, a former grammar school teacher who had also organised the opening of coffee-house for young people, being beaten by masked soldiers; on the following day he died as a result of his serious injuries. A friend of the teacher, by profession a goldsmith, died of his injuries two days after Mr. ZECEVIC's death. The witness says that many prisoners died in this way.

The witness reports that in October 1992, 11 prisoners who had been ill-treated and tortured extremely severely were taken out of the hall where the witness was staying and were transported out of the camp. When they were leaving, the witness could see worms in the wounds on the feet of one prisoner who was being carried out of the hall. Very probably these prisoners were later executed because they had occupied political functions and had been told time and again that they would never be allowed to leave the camp alive.

The witness also reports that a Croat who had tried to escape was so badly ill-treated by Serb soldiers that his face was totally disfigured so that the witness did not recognise him.

3.2.2.3. BOSANSKI NOVI

Code No. BBN5

This witness was arrested by Serb soldiers at BOSANSKI NOVI in early June 1992 and was taken to a warehouse with other inhabitants of the village; from there, they were taken to DOBOY (100 km from Banjaluka) in a train comprising about 15 railway waggons. Before the prisoners entered the waggons, the witness saw about 10 - 15 persons being shot point-blank by Serb soldiers. Their dead bodies were left behind. Among the people shot were his neighbours Sulejman BURZIC (manual worker in Zagreb, aged 50), Camil ALIC (electrician, aged 35), Samid IMSIROVIC (butcher, aged 30), Ismet SELEMAGIC (clerk, aged 32) and Sifet BARJEKTAROVIC (local politician, aged 34). The prisoners were held in these waggons for three days without water and food. They had to relieve themselves in the corners of the waggon. Then the train went to DOBOY. There all had to get off. Then 800 men, among them the witness, were loaded into the waggons again and the train went back to BOSANSKI NOVI. They were all taken to the football stadium at BOSANSKI NOVI (SLOBODA STADIUM). There the prisoners were ordered to eat

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grass. The prisoners were guarded by about 20 soldiers. Then some prisoners were handed rubber truncheons to beat other prisoners. This procedure was repeated by turns. Some prisoners were ordered to haul a heavy roller used to level the ground in the stadium. When trying to do this, some prisoners fainted from exhaustion.

The witness was detained at that stadium for 45 days. During that time, prisoners would be picked from the crowd and taken away. The witness knows nothing of their fate. On 23 July 1992, the stadium was visited by a UN commission, whereupon the prisoners were transferred to KARLOVAC. The witness came to Austria on 12 October 1992.

3.2.3. Rape

3.2.3.1. The case from DRINJACA

Code No. CD1

The witness lived at DRINJACA (20 km from GREAT ZVORNIK). She was arrested by Serb soldiers on 28 May 1992 at 10.00 a.m. with her three children and other women and children. They were taken to a young people's home where there were about 35 men.

On their arrival, the witness and other women saw these men, who were standing in front of the building, being beaten by soldiers and then shot. Then the women were led into the building and were not allowed to leave it. At about 11.00 p.m., about twenty soldiers entered the building, selected some women from the crowd and led them out of the building. The witness was raped twice by two soldiers on the back seat of a car. In that night, women were raped until 7.00 in the morning. A girl from KOSTIJEROVO, for example, was raped five times. The children had no idea of these rapes. Their mothers only told them that they had been taken to interrogations. The witness /...

says that she did not become pregnant because she was using a contraceptive (an IUD).

On 29 May 1992 at 10.00 a. m., all women with their children were taken to a school at MEMIC (between TUZLA and ZVORNIK). There two young women, the witness's daughter (aged 14) and two teenage boys were taken away to interrogation. The children were not ill-treated.

On 30 May 1992 at 5.00 p.m., the women were ordered to walk or rather run on foot to KALEJSIJA (14 km). At KALEJSIJA, the Serbs let the women go. With the help of Bosnian soldiers, the women were the driven in lorries to MEDZAS (10 km from TUZLA), where the witness was able to rejoin her daughter who had been taken away for interrogation at MEMIC.

3.2.3.2. The case from FOCA

Code No. CF1

This witness was raped by two Serb soldiers.

On the Islamic holiday in early June 1992, at about 11.30 p.m., four persons, two in uniform and the other two in civilian clothes, broke down the door to the witness's flat which was on the 7th floor of a housing block. Among the men were Dragen PEJOVIC, a fellow worker of her sister's, and Islam BASIC MIRADA, who worked in public transport in the town of FOCA. They asked for the witness's sister, who was at that time in the neighbouring flat. The men threatened the witness with a knife and ordered her, a friend of hers and her sister to go to the stairwell of the house. At first the men wanted the witness's sister to go into the empty flat with them. When she began to weep, they left her alone. Then the men ordered the witness to go to the neighbouring flat, where her friend's children were sleeping. Two of these men (one in uniform and

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the other in civilian clothes) followed her. They had hardly arrived when they ordered the witness to undress. The man in civilian clothes cut her clothes off her body with a knife. They said they would show her what Moslem men had done to Serbian women. Then they raped the witness. They looted the flat. When one could hear sirens outside, the two others ran away. One of the rapists tore off her necklace with a knife and also took her ring.

A neighbour living on the first floor had informed the police after the four men had asked for the witness's sister. Since KARADZIC's brother, who is a deputy, also lived on the first floor, a police car drove by, but the policemen did not enter the house. The siren of that car prompted the men to leave the witness's flat.

The witness says that on 29 April 1992 her house was set on fire by Serbs and her husband was kidnapped and killed. She says that a former neighbour, a policeman whose name she knows, was responsible for that.

3.2.3.2. The case from Sarajevo

Code No. CS1

This witness is by profession a nurse from Sarajevo and she saw Serb soldiers raping a 12-year-old girl.

In mid-May 1992, at about 4.00 in the morning, Serbian units attacked the residential area of NASELJE near SARAJEVO airport. Civilians were taken out of the cellars and forced to stand in the streets as human shields. This was in order to force the Moslem units not to shoot at the Serbs. The civilians were divided up into two groups, a Moslem group and a Serb group. The witness states that an elderly man of Serbian descent refused to join the Serb group, whereupon he was beaten by /...

about 5 - 6 Serb soldiers with rifle butts until he collapsed dead. Reportedly they were both Federal Army soldiers and chetniks. The civilians were ordered to walk along the street with raised arms. Then they were taken to a camp in lorries and buses (a drive of about 3 km). After their arrival, the civilians had to stand in a row. Immediately afterwards, 5 soldiers took a 12-year-old girl who was standing among the others with her father and led her behind the building in front of which the group was standing. There the soldiers raped the girl. As a result of the girl's weeping and cries, her father collapsed. Shortly afterwards, one of the soldiers came back and fetched the father to make him watch his daughter's rape from close up. People heard the girl's cries for an hour. This was about 1.00 p.m.

The witness says that if there were an identification parade, she would recognise at least one of these soldiers. She thinks that the soldiers were followers of KARADZIC.

Then the men were separated from the women. At about 3.00 p.m. the men were driven away from the camp in lorries. The women were released from the camp on the same afternoon at about 4.00 p.m. The witness believes that the women's release was due to the fact that shortly before their release a UN convoy drove by the camp. This was also why a soldier who had been molesting her sexually stopped and left her alone. The witness returned to her work at the clinic on the same evening. She entered Austria on 14 September 1992. She returned to Sarajevo, however, in order to take her children from Belgrade to Austria. Her second entry into Austria was on 22 September 1992.

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3.2.4. Arbitrary shootings and massacres

3.2.4.1. VISEGRAD

Code No. DV1

This witness served in the Bosnian Army from 6 April to late August 1992 and has several incidents to report.

1st incident

Together with 11 other soldiers stationed on the VISEGRAD "CRNI VRH" defence line, the witness on a day in early June 1992 at about 4.00 p.m. saw through binoculars at a distance of about 1 km two chetniks shooting two girls aged between 8 and 10 with their automatic rifles (M 70). The corpses were left lying there. The soldiers wanted to go to the place but were prevented by their commander, whose name the witness does not want to say.

2nd incident

On a day in mid-June 1992 at about 6.00 p.m., at the KRIZEVAC cemetery in JELIKA GOSTILJA (6 km from VISEGRAD) the witness buried four dead bodies of people three of whom he knew by name (Ramo POLJO, Rifet POLJO and Nermin SABANOVIC). They had been shot by chetniks with M 53 machine-guns. In one of the bodies the genitals had been cut off before the shooting. He saw clear traces of torture in these bodies. These corpses had been thrown on to a heap of hay by the chetniks in order to burn them. But reportedly there was not enough time, so they left the corpses where they were.

3rd incident

On 26 June 1992 at about 11.00 a.m., about 113 civilians from the town of VELIKA POLJE GOSTILJA were arrested and taken to /...

the HASSAN VELETOVAC school, where there were already 400 persons. Of these 113 civilians, 72 (among them 10 children under 2 years of age) were transferred to BIKAVAC (6 km from VELIKA POLJE GOSTILJA) to the ALIC house. Among these 72 persons were his mother, his sister with her 18-month daughter and other relatives of the witness; at the time of these events he had no idea of what was happening, as he was on duty at LASCI (3 km from VELIKA POLJE GOSTILJA). The house was surrounded with barricades by the soldiers so that no one could leave it. Then they threw smoke bombs at the house, which began to burn. The witness heard later that his relatives were among the dead. Only one woman was able to save her life by escaping through a cellar window. That woman is said to be in a hospital at ZENICE (about 120 km from Sarajevo). She is the only witness able to describe what happened.

4th incident

On 29 June 1992 at about 12.00 noon, the witness saw Serb soldiers shooting at houses of civilians from their tanks. A house where a family of six, named FEJZIC, lived was destroyed by the tank fire. The witness with other soldiers buried the dead bodies found in that house in a meadow.

5th incident

Again in late June 1992, in a forest near the village of ZEPA the witness discovered about 97 dead bodies with their throats cut or their heads severed or fractured. The witness buried these corpses with other villagers and soldiers, which took them ten days. A list of these corpses was drawn up.

The witness says that of the inhabitants of his home town, VISEGRAD, about 5,000 - 6,000 were killed.

The witness gives the names of Serbs who are responsible for the war crimes.

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3.2.4.2. LJUBIJA

Code No. EL1

On 7 July 1992, at the mine of Ljubija (11 km from PRIJEDOR) this witness discovered a mass grave in which mainly children were buried. The corpses were from the village of HAMBARINE (located 4 km from the mine) which had been attacked by the Serbs in May 1992. The corpses, which had been covered with earth by excavators, were washed free by the rain so that parts of bodies could be seen from afar sticking out of the ground. The witness stated that in the lake near the mine (at a distance of about 100 m) corpses had also been dumped, from the village of BISCANI (3 km to the west of PRIJEDOR), but the witness had not seen them.

3.2.5. Ethnic cleansing

3.2.5.1. The case from KOZARAC

Code No. EK1

The witness is of Ukraininan descent and had to leave his home town of KOZARAC (PRIJEDOR) as a result of the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing.

On 24 May, the Serbs attacked his home town. The town was under Serb artillery bombardment for 24 hours. After the occupation of the town, the soldiers ordered the inhabitants to go to a school at TRNOPOLJE (6 km from KOZARAC) within half an hour. Ethnic cleansing in this region went on for about 1 month. The Serbs burned down the Moslems' houses located off the main street and established a military camp there. The men from that region were taken to camps at KERATERM, OMARSKA and TRNOPOLJE. After the occupation, the Serbs conscripted the Serbian men

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living in the region for military service. If they resisted, they were taken to the above-mentioned camps. The witness obeyed the orders of the Serbs and put on his uniform which he still had from the time of his military service. As he was a small farmer by trade, he served as a reservist and was given a threshing machine with which he worked the fields. During his work, the witness discovered several dead bodies in the fields, which had been left lying there as a result of the war.

On a day towards the end of July 1992, at about 4.00 p.m., the witness saw a group of soldiers entering the house of the woman who was his neighbour. Shortly thereafter he heard shots. On the following day, the witness discovered the dead body of Fikret HODZIJE, a body builder known throughout the world.

The reason for his flight was the fact that at a meeting of about 80 men organised by the local commander on a Sunday in July near the school, a friend of his had been threatened by a Serb soldier who remarked that his "rifle had killed Moslems and would also kill Ukrainians." A similar remark to the effect that "today Moslems, tomorrow it's the Ukrainians' turn" and the fact that the main church of the Ukrainians at BANJALUKA had been destroyed compelled the witness to leave his home town, where there were about 80 Ukrainian houses. On 18 August 1992, he fled through Serbian territory by bus. He got his exit permit from a friend of his, a Serb policeman, against payment. He also had to give the local authorities a written waiver.

The witness says that mass murders had taken place at the village of BISCANI (4 km from PRIJEDOR). He had heard this from Serbs.

3.2.5.2. The case from BOSANSKI NOVI

Code No. EBN1

This witness is by profession a judge. On 15 June 1992, he saw from his room at the court building Serb soldiers destroying the mosque across the street from the court with anti-tank rockets (bazookas). The judge was advised to leave the town. Before he did, he saw the Moslems being driven out of the town by the Serbs.

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/48/154
S/25614
16 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 71 of the preliminary list*
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 15 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On 29 June 1992, the Republic of Croatia, pursuant to the Constitutional Decision of 25 June 1991 on sovereignty and independence, informed the Government of the United States of America, in its capacity as depositary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that, as one of the successor States to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it accepts the Treaty and undertakes to abide by the stipulations contained therein.

Upon instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Republic of Croatia associates itself entirely with the joint statement of the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America as depositaries of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (S/25515, annex). The Republic of Croatia expresses concern at the decision of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 71 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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* A/48/50.

93-22114 (E) 160493 180493

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25615
16 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 APRIL 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation to H.E. Mr. Engin Ansay, Ambassador, Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the United Nations, to address the Council under the rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure in the course of the Council's consideration of the item currently on its agenda.

(Signed) Tahsin BURCUOĞLU
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

93-22145 (E) 160493 180493

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25616
16 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Forces directed, controlled and supported by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continue their assault on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, intensify their assault on Srebrenica. This assault is an act of genocide perpetrated in violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

It constitutes a direct violation of the Order of the International Court of Justice that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) "should in particular ensure that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it as well as any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence do not commit any acts of genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide, of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide ...".

Pursuant to Article 94, paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, request is hereby made that the Security Council take immediate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to stop the assault and to enforce the Order of the International Court of Justice.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25617
16 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all its subsequent relevant resolutions,

Taking note that the International Court of Justice in its Order of 8 April 1993 in the case concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) unanimously indicated as a provisional measure that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming its call on the parties and others concerned to observe immediately the cease-fire throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, including, in particular, the practice of "ethnic cleansing",

Concerned by the pattern of hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against towns and villages in eastern Bosnia and in this regard reaffirming that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force, including through the practice of "ethnic cleansing", is unlawful and unacceptable,

Deeply alarmed at the information provided by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 16 April 1993 on the rapid deterioration of the situation in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas, as a result of the continued deliberate armed attacks and shelling of the innocent civilian population by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units,

Strongly condemning the deliberate interdiction by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units of humanitarian assistance convoys,

Also strongly condemning the actions taken by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against UNPROFOR, in particular, their refusal to guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of UNPROFOR personnel,

Aware that a tragic humanitarian emergency has already developed in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as a direct consequence of the brutal actions of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units, forcing the large-scale displacement of civilians, in particular women, children and the elderly,

Recalling the provisions of resolution 815 (1993) on the mandate of UNPROFOR and in that context acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act;

2. Demands also to that effect the immediate cessation of armed attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against Srebrenica and their immediate withdrawal from the areas surrounding Srebrenica;

3. Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, with a view to monitoring the humanitarian situation in the safe area, to take immediate steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and its surroundings; demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully and promptly with UNPROFOR towards that end; and requests the Secretary-General to report urgently thereon to the Security Council;

5. Reaffirms that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force, including through the practice of "ethnic cleansing", is unlawful and unacceptable;

6. Condemns and rejects the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as well as from other parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of its overall abhorrent campaign of "ethnic cleansing";

7. Reaffirms its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and reaffirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts shall be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

8. Demands the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular to the civilian population of Srebrenica and its surrounding areas and recalls that such impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian law;

9. Urges the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to use all the resources at their disposal within the scope of the relevant resolutions of the Council to reinforce the existing humanitarian operations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular Srebrenica and its surroundings;

10. Further demands that all parties guarantee the safety and full freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and of all other United Nations personnel as well as members of humanitarian organizations;

11. Further requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with UNHCR and UNPROFOR, to arrange for the safe transfer of the wounded and ill civilians from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas and to urgently report thereon to the Council;

12. Decides to send, as soon as possible, a mission of members of the Security Council to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ascertain the situation and report thereon to the Security Council;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider further steps to achieve a solution in conformity with relevant resolutions of the Council.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25618
17 April 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 15 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I wish to convey to you the following:

The letter of the representative of the Iraqi regime contained in document S/25534 constitutes a continuation of the course of disinformation persisted in by that regime in order to divert attention from its failure to implement the Security Council resolutions relating to its aggression and its occupation of Kuwait.

Firstly, it is noted that the representative of this regime has set himself up as an arbitrator and scrutinizer of Kuwait's policy in the demilitarized zone. The above-mentioned representative has thus lost sight of the role played by the neutral authority entrusted by the Security Council with the task of observing the policy and conduct of Kuwait and Iraq alike, namely, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM). Also, perhaps he did not examine very carefully the Secretary-General's report for the period 29 January to 23 March 1993 (S/25514), containing an account of Iraq's repeated violations at the beginning of the current year, which led to the adoption of resolution 806 (1993), which approved, inter alia, the extension of the terms of reference of UNIKOM.

Secondly, it is noted that the events mentioned in the Iraqi representative's letter are merely fallacies fabricated by the Iraqi authorities. On this matter, attention should be drawn to the following:

1. The Kuwaiti authorities have no knowledge of the incident that Iraq claims took place on 29 January 1993. Even if Kuwait had been a party to it, the Kuwaiti authorities would have been notified of this by UNIKOM.

2. With regard to the alleged incident relating to the abduction of two Iraqis on 19 February 1993, the truth of the matter is that UNIKOM notified the Kuwaiti authorities of the incident after these two had penetrated more than 1 kilometre inside Kuwaiti territory. The Kuwaiti authorities promised UNIKOM to search for them.

3. With regard to the incident that occurred on 20 February 1993, the truth of the matter is that a Kuwaiti patrol seized the two Iraqi soldiers inside Kuwaiti territory, contacted UNIKOM and handed over the two soldiers to it on 21 February 1993.

4. With regard to the incident that Iraq claims occurred on 5 March 1993, the Kuwaiti authorities joined UNIKOM in investigating the incident. There is nothing to indicate that any individual from the Kuwaiti post was responsible for it.

5. What was stated under point 4 applies also to the incident alleged to have taken place on 18 March 1993. There is no evidence that individuals from the Kuwaiti post were responsible for the incident.

6. With regard to the incident of 23 March 1993, the truth of the matter is that the Kuwaiti vehicle was inside Kuwaiti territory, as borne out by the geographical coordinate mentioned in the letter from the representative of the Iraqi regime.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25619
17 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 APRIL 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With regard to the letter of Mr. M. Sacirbey (S/25529) of 5 April 1993 addressed to Your Excellency, I would like to deny in the strongest terms the malicious allegations contained in the said letter.

Such charges, as well as those that "a convoy of armoured vehicles entered Zeleni Jadar, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the territory of the Republic of Serbia" are shameless fabrications whose sole purpose is to step up the pressure on, and impose new sanctions against, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

It is widely known that the Army of Yugoslavia left the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina almost a year ago and that there is not a single soldier of the Army of Yugoslavia in its territory. Furthermore, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in no way a party to the civil, inter-ethnic and religious war in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25620
19 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN FOR THE ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION OF IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH RELEVANT PARTS OF SECTION C OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

Report of the Secretary-General

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is the third submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), adopted on 11 October 1991, by which the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the Special Commission's plans for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It updates the information contained in the first two reports (S/23801 and S/24661).

2. In brief, in the period under review, Iraq has continued its refusal to provide unconditional acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder. It has further underlined its position that the only obligation it recognizes in respect to ongoing monitoring and verification is that contained in paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991) and that it does not accept the modalities and arrangements for such monitoring and verification as laid down in the plans approved by the Council in resolution 715 (1991). In these circumstances, no progress has been made in carrying out the ongoing monitoring and verification approved by the Council in resolution 715 (1991).

I. DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PERIOD 11 OCTOBER 1992-10 APRIL 1993

A. Provision of information

3. Under the Special Commission's ongoing monitoring and verification plan (S/22871/Rev.1), Iraq is obliged to provide certain declarations. The first were due by 10 November 1991, concerning (a) initial information on the dual-purpose activities, facilities and items specified in the plan and its annexes; and (b) a report on the legislative and administrative measures taken to implement resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), other relevant Security Council

resolutions and the plan. Iraq is further obliged to update the information on (a) each 15 January and 15 July, and to report further on (b) when requested to do so by the Commission.

4. As was noted in the last report (S/24661), no declarations were received from Iraq until 27 June 1992, i.e., Iraq missed the first two reporting requirements. The product received on 27 June was called by Iraq "Report on future compliance and monitoring". However, a group of international experts convened by the Commission to assess this report deemed it, while providing a basis on which to build, to be inadequate for the purpose of commencing ongoing monitoring and verification activities. Furthermore, the report contained no declaration on the legislative and administrative measures taken by Iraq to give effect to its obligations.

5. On 14 February 1993, Iraq provided a second set of declarations entitled "Updated monitoring information. Report No. 2". These add little to the first set.

6. A further difficulty relates to the inadequacy of a different set of declarations Iraq is obliged to provide - the full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons programmes proscribed under section C of resolution 687 (1991), as required under resolution 707 (1991). In particular, complete information on Iraq's past production, suppliers and use of prohibited items and its past capacity to produce such items is necessary in order to plan effective inspection and import control regimes as required under the future ongoing monitoring and verification plans and Security Council resolution 715 (1991). The mechanism foreseen in paragraph 7 of that resolution can only be realistically designed when this information is available to the Sanctions Committee, the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

B. Operational developments

7. Due to Iraq's continued refusal to provide unconditional acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved thereunder, the Special Commission continues to be unable to begin implementation of the plan covering its areas of competence (S/22871/Rev.1). However, the Commission has identified certain facilities and activities in Iraq which clearly need to be monitored in the interim because they could already be put to prohibited use. Consequently, the Commission has instituted a new type of inspection activity, termed "interim monitoring". The introduction of this activity in no way diminishes the requirement to institute full-scale monitoring as envisaged in the plans and hence does not diminish the importance of Iraq acknowledging unconditionally its obligations under them.

8. The first interim monitoring team was established on 26 January 1993, based at the Ibn Al-Haytham missile research centre to the north of Baghdad. Iraq has declared this centre to be its principal facility for research into and development of missiles with a range of less than 150 kilometres, that is, those not banned under the terms of resolution 687 (1991). The centre employs a significant number of scientists previously employed in Iraq's now proscribed ballistic missile programmes. While its work centred around the Ibn Al-Haytham

facility, the team also visited other sites. It completed its work on 23 March 1993.

9. Based on the experience of the team at Ibn Al-Haytham, which in part highlighted the significant amount of ongoing activity in Iraq on solid propellant missile systems, the Commission decided it would be useful to continue this inspection effort. A second team was established on 27 March 1993. While it will continue the task of monitoring the Ibn Al-Haytham centre, other facilities in Iraq conducting work on solid propulsion and related technologies will also be monitored.

C. Political developments

10. On the substance of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, Iraq's position remains unchanged. By a letter dated 28 October 1992 from the Iraqi Foreign Minister addressed to the Secretary-General (S/24726, annex), Iraq reiterated its opposition to resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) by stating that:

> "It is ... essential for the Council to conduct a radical review, on the basis of justice and fairness, of the terms and provisions of these two resolutions."

11. In his statements to the Council on 23 November (S/PV.3139, resumption 1) and 24 November 1992 (S/PV.3139, resumption 2), the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, said:

> "[T]here is a need for all those measures and the provisions of the no longer necessary Security Council's resolutions to be drastically reviewed." (ibid., resumption 1, p. 98)

12. On 31 January 1993, the Iraqi Government officially informed the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission in writing that Iraq considered the new arrangement of interim monitoring at the Ibn Al-Haytham facility to be conducted under resolution 687 (1991). The Commission understood this to mean that Iraq would prevent this team, or any other team, from operating under the terms of the plan approved under resolution 715 (1991).

13. As recently as 29 March 1993, during discussions on the modalities for the second interim monitoring team, Commission personnel detected no change on the part of Iraq on the fundamental issues of acknowledgement of resolution 715 (1991) and on the provision of data on suppliers. This was borne out on 1 April 1993, when General Amer met the team. Reading from prepared notes and stressing that this was the official Iraqi position on the issue of monitoring, General Amer is reported by the United Nations Chief Inspector to have said:

> "Iraq accepted the first monitoring team to the Ibn Al-Haytham centre in accordance with resolution 687 (1991). However, it appears from the modalities of the monitoring team that the Special Commission is trying to overlap in a discreet fashion Iraqi obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and resolution 715 (1991). This is very clever. Iraq knows that, using Iraqi cooperation under resolution 687 (1991), the Special Commission wants

to assert Iraqi obligations under resolution 715 (1991). Iraq is fully aware of this effort. If the objective of the Special Commission is to make sure that no prohibited activities are going on, prohibited items are destroyed and Iraq has no capability to reactivate proscribed programmes, Iraq has no objections as this is part of resolution 687 (1991). However, if the objective is to start a de facto implementation of resolution 715 (1991) without Special Commission testament to the Security Council that Iraq is in full compliance with resolution 687 (1991) and without implementing paragraph 22 of that resolution, Iraq will not welcome this mission. The monitoring missions would not be welcome. But even in this case, Iraq will still cooperate with the Special Commission to see the true objectives of these missions and to explore the intentions of the Special Commission. Iraq told the Special Commission that resolution 715 (1991) could only be discussed in connection with the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). You should never think or believe that it could be done otherwise."

14. Iraq's position is maintained despite assurances by the Commission that, if Iraq cooperated, its legitimate concerns would be met and the Commission's activities would be carried out in a manner which is not unduly intrusive.

D. Iraqi conduct

15. In addition to these statements of position, Iraq has, through its conduct over recent months, consistently demonstrated its desire to limit the Commission's inspection rights and operational capabilities through seeking to place restrictions on inspectors in the course of their work. While many of these Iraqi actions have taken place during the course of inspections under resolution 687 (1991), the Commission has no doubt that they form part of a long-term campaign to establish a practice for the conduct of inspections which would severely restrict the rights provided in the plans and relevant Security Council resolutions. Iraq is thus clearly seeking to assert for itself the right to interpret how the resolutions should be implemented.

16. Included in this campaign have been attempts by Iraq: to restrict the scope of inspections and information gathering; to restrict access and impose delays on inspections; to restrict the exercise of the Commission's aerial rights; to impose limits on the duration, size and composition of inspections; to require advance notice of inspection activities; and to limit the right to take photography. Further details on these incidents can be found in the annex to the present report. Each incident has varied in seriousness. Some might not be significant were they not part of a general trend. However, when taken together, these incidents add up to a major impediment which would effectively impede credible long-term monitoring and verification. This again underlines the need to obtain from Iraq as soon as possible its formal acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution 715 (1991), so that the Council's requirements laid down in that resolution can be met.

II. CONCLUSIONS

17. The conditions for the initiation in full of the Special Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification have still not been met. There has again been no movement in Iraq's underlying negative position on the plan and resolution 715 (1991). The Commission's assessment remains that Iraq is seeking to ensure that implementation of the plan proceeds on the basis of its interpretation of its obligations, rather than on the basis of Security Council resolutions and the plan adopted by the Council.

18. Iraq's spurious complaints and allegations about the motives and activities of the Commission, some of which are recorded in the annex, demonstrate Iraq's unwillingness both to comply with its obligations and to facilitate the task of the Commission. Iraq's reluctance to provide willingly the information required by the Commission in order for it to fulfil its mandate means that the Commission has to be more extensive and intrusive in its efforts to obtain that information. This reluctance and Iraq's attempts to limit the Commission's endeavours raise doubts about Iraq's intent. This, in turn, raises the degree of certainty that the Commission requires about Iraq's capabilities and about the use to which it puts its dual-capable facilities before the Commission can report with confidence that Iraq is in substantial compliance with its obligations arising from the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

19. In the meantime, the Commission continues to revisit or survey from the air sites identified as having been used for activities proscribed by section C of resolution 687 (1991) in order to ensure that those activities have not been resumed. The Commission has already identified many additional sites which will require future monitoring. It continues to seek to supplement the information provided by Iraq through vigorous questioning and inspection, so that the initiation of full-scale monitoring will not be unduly delayed once Iraq makes the necessary political commitment to full compliance. A key element of this process has been the recent initiation of the interim monitoring concept.

20. Nevertheless, the Commission remains constrained from going beyond preparatory and interim work into full-scale monitoring and verification. Iraq's stance on the fundamental issues, its conduct referred to above and its failure to acknowledge its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) only underscore this conclusion. Unless Iraq changes its position, the Commission will not be in a position to ensure that Iraq does not reactivate its proscribed programmes.

Annex

Compendium of incidents

Restrictions on the scope of inspections

1. Paragraphs 13 to 15 of the present report note the Iraqi reaction to the initiation of interim monitoring. During the course of activity of the first interim monitoring team, several other discussions occurred that indicated a misconception, deliberate or otherwise, on the part of Iraq. The Iraqi counterparts questioned the right of the team to make an inventory of or to tag certain items of equipment at the sites monitored, requesting that specific criteria be established and be used to decide which items might be so treated. The team did not accept this position. Iraq indicated that certain items were of no concern to the Special Commission, when clearly the decision as to what is of concern to it lies with the Commission. Furthermore, some of the items involved have the potential to be used for proscribed purposes. The counterparts also complained about the purpose of the team, stating that it was to control, not monitor, Iraq's activities.

Denial of or restrictions on access and delays to inspection

2. On four occasions, Iraq has sought to deny the Commission's basic aerial rights - once in relation to entry of transport aircraft into and out of Iraq (see S/25172, annex), and thrice in relation to overflight of sites for aerial surveillance by helicopter. Except for the flight over the two sites on the outskirts of Baghdad (reported in S/24985, annex), the Commission was eventually able to conduct the flights. However, as already reported to the Council, one of these flights had to be conducted with a restricted flight pattern, and not before Iraq had threatened to shoot the helicopter down if it did not leave the vicinity of the site.

3. Iraq has also hindered access for inspection teams, sometimes seeking, on spurious grounds, completely to deny access. One team was initially denied access because inspection would "breach the sanctity of universities and would upset the students". In each instance, the inspection eventually took place. In the period under review, a total of eight Commission inspection activities were seriously delayed, in one case by over four hours. One, the aerial surveillance on the outskirts of Baghdad, has been blocked.

Restrictions on aerial rights

4. Paragraphs 11 (f) and (h) of the six-monthly report of 17 December 1992 (S/24984, annex) described at length the problems faced until that date by the Special Commission. Problems have continued since. In addition to the incidents referred to in paragraph 2 of the present annex, Iraq has created further difficulties in relation to the Commission's aerial rights.

5. In his letter of 5 August 1992, Mr. Al-Zahawi, Adviser in the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, informed the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission that his request to use the Al-Rasheed airfield as the point of entry and departure for inspection teams was unworkable, as the airfield was

unserviceable. The Deputy Executive Chairman replied the next day, expressing the desire to so use Al-Rasheed airfield as soon as it became operational. Recently, Sudanese Airways Boeing 707 aircraft have been observed using the airfield. However, enquiries by Commission personnel about the possibility of using it as the point of entry and exit have met with the response that such a decision would be political. No progress has been made on this issue.

6. Iraq has created problems in the operation of the Aerial Inspection Team. It has sought: to establish "no go" areas over which the team may not fly and which may not be included in the boxes designated the night before aerial inspections; to prevent the team from taking photographs and using binoculars while flying between designated sites and even over the designated site; and to demand 10 minutes' notice before an aerial inspection starts.

7. Each time the Commission's high-altitude U-2 surveillance aircraft flies, Iraq lodges a formal complaint about its activities. Iraq persists in calling the aircraft a United States spy plane and has recently described it as being used for "despicable criminal purposes", despite its United Nations registration and mandate. On 10 March 1993, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Mr. Al-Sahaf, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General (S/25387, annex), in which he alleged that the aircraft had been used to assist in the planning of an Israeli operation to assassinate President Saddam Hussein.

Limits on the duration, size and composition of inspections

8. Iraq has sought to limit the duration of both monitoring and aerial surveillance activities, indicating, in relation to the former, that they should be of finite duration and, in relation to the latter, that aerial inspections should not last longer than 15 minutes.

9. Iraq has also sought to limit the size of inspection teams at certain sites it deems sensitive, such as universities, and to interfere in the composition of the team by, for example, seeking to exclude the Commission's own interpreters from a team. It has also sought to establish that those involved in the chemical destruction Group at Al Muthanna are not permitted to take part in other inspection activities and to limit the turnover of Commission personnel in the helicopter support staff.

10. It is clear from the Status Agreement of May 1991 that the Commission has the right to decide the expertise it needs to conduct inspections and hence the right to choose the number and the types of experts it needs on each team and to inspect each site. Iraq is obliged to allow personnel named by the Commission access to conduct their tasks.

Advance notice of inspection activities

11. For aerial surveillance activities, Iraq has sought to establish that it should receive advance notice of the site to be surveyed. No-notice inspections are essential to the effectiveness of the Commission.

Provision of data

12. As noted in section A of the present report, Iraq has failed to provide adequate declarations either of its past proscribed programmes or of its dual-capable facilities which would need to be incorporated into the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. The Commission has sought to supplement those declarations during each of its inspections. However, Iraq refuses to offer information willingly, or at all, in certain key areas, e.g., on its supplier networks or its previous use of chemical weapons. Consternation has also been expressed by Iraqi counterparts that the Commission continues to ask questions about Iraq's past programmes, despite the fact that these questions were asked because of Iraq's failure to fulfil its obligation to make full, final and complete disclosures on all aspects of its past programmes (see para. 6 of the present report).

13. Furthermore, Iraq has been unable or unwilling to produce specific items of equipment that the Commission has evidence were supplied to Iraq. Teams continue to find equipment and documents containing information pertinent to their mandate under the resolutions and ongoing monitoring and verification plan.

Photography

14. Iraq has sought to limit the Commission's unrestricted right to photograph any item or activity it deems of relevance to its task. Iraq has delayed photography until "permission" has been obtained from more senior officials; it has sought to prevent photography over a designated site; and it has sought to limit aerial photography to items within a set perimeter and inspection team photography to items Iraq deems to be related to resolution 687 (1991). If this last rule were applied, it would open the possibility of Iraq deciding what was "687-related" and could be used by Iraq to exclude all dual-purpose facilities, items and activities covered by the plans approved under resolution 715 (1991).

Security

15. The issue of security was dealt with at length in document S/24984, appendix II. Since that report and in addition to the threats to the Commission's aircraft referred to above, there have been continued incidents of vandalism of Commission vehicles, including the smashing of windscreens, windows and mirrors and the breaking of aerials. Four of these incidents occurred while the vehicles were being driven by Commission personnel. In one incident, the drivers were medics and the vehicle bore Red Crescent markings.

16. Items continue to be taken from the offices and personal quarters of the Commission. Staff continue sporadically to receive threatening and harassing telephone calls in their hotel rooms in the middle of the night.

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Security Council

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S/25621
19 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 8 April 1993 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Paragraph 8 of resolution 715 (1991), adopted by the Security Council on 11 October 1991, requests the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit to the Security Council reports on the implementation of the Agency's plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). These reports are to be submitted when requested by the Security Council and, in any event, at least every six months after the adoption of resolution 715. The first two reports were submitted to you on 11 April and 30 September 1992, and distributed to the Security Council as S/23813 (15 April 1992) and S/24722 (28 October 1992), respectively.

Accordingly, I am requesting you to kindly transmit to the President of the Security Council the enclosed third six-month report on the implementation of the Plan and remain available for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

THIRD REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGENCY'S PLAN FOR FUTURE ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION OF IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 12 OF RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

1. On 11 October 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 715 (1991) approving, inter alia, the plan submitted in document S/22872/Rev.1/Corr.1 by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of Part C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and with the requirements of paragraphs 3 and 5 of resolution 707 (1991). In paragraph 8 of resolution 715, the Security Council requested the Director General of the IAEA to submit to it reports on the implementation of the plan when requested by the Security Council and, in any event, at least every six months after the adoption of resolution 715. The first two reports submitted by the Director General were circulated on 15 April 1992, as S/23813, and 28 October 1992, as S/24722, respectively.

2. The Director General hereby submits the third six-month report on implementation of the plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification related to Iraq's nuclear capabilities (hereinafter referred to as the Plan).

3. Since the last report of 28 October 1992, the IAEA has carried out four inspection missions in Iraq, the Fifteenth (8 - 18 November 1992), Sixteenth (5 - 8 December 1992), Seventeenth (25 - 31 January 1993) and Eighteenth (3 - 11 March 1993) Inspections. The Nineteenth Inspection mission is currently scheduled to take place at the end of April 1993.

DECLARATION OF ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE PLAN

4. In accordance with paragraph 22 of the Plan, Iraq is obliged to declare to the IAEA items subject to the Plan and to provide, inter alia, an inventory of all material, equipment and

other items in Iraq identified in Annex 3 of the Plan. The items in the Annex include those specifically prohibited under resolution 687, as well as others which may be prohibited, depending on their use or intended use, or subject to monitoring under the Plan. As previously reported to the Security Council, the Iraqi authorities' original declaration was inadequate in scope and in form.

5. During the Fifteenth Inspection, the Iraqi counterpart provided the IAEA inspection team with a draft of a revised declaration (10 November 1992). The IAEA team provided detailed comments on the inadequacies which remained. Specifically, the Iraqi counterpart was advised as follows:

a. Iraq is to include in the inventory any relevant items which was present on or after 1 January 1989, even if such items had been destroyed during or after the war.

b. The declaration should be self-contained in the sense that it should not include vague references to previous correspondence.

c. Items required to be declared under paragraph 4 of Annex 3 (equipment or materials referred to in Section 2 of Memorandum B of INFCIRC/209/Rev.1 and in the Annex to INFCIRC/209/Rev.1) should be declared separately under paragraph 4, rather than incorporated within paragraphs 5 - 70 of Annex 3. It was explained to the Iraqi counterpart that there are many INFCIRC/209/Rev.1 items which have no corresponding entry in the other paragraphs of the Annex and which were therefore missing entirely in the most recent Iraqi draft update of its declaration. Furthermore, because INFCIRC/209/Rev.1 is quite detailed in its description of various especially designed or prepared components and equipment, reference

to it will produce a more specific and useful accounting of centrifuge components, for example, than that which appeared in the Iraqi draft.

d. The Iraqi counterpart was also advised of specific questions concerning possible omissions or errors in Iraq's draft declaration of 10 November 1992.

e. The declaration should be comprehensive, including all relevant items in Iraq, not just those belonging to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.

f. Machine tools should be included in the declaration if the manufacturers' specifications correspond to the specifications set out in Annex 3, or if modifications were made in Iraq to meet these specifications. Only the Agency may determine whether the present condition of specific machine tools warrants removal of such machine tools from the inventory.

6. A commitment was made by the Iraqi authorities to submit an amended declaration, which would cover the country as a whole, by the end of 1992. At the end of the Seventeenth Inspection, the Iraqi authorities provided the IAEA team a revised list of Annex 3 items which the Iraqis described as covering the period from 1 January 1989 and including all Annex 3 items which exist or existed in IAEC facilities, universities and State Establishments which supported the IAEC programme. However, the Iraqi counterparts reserved the right to include items which might have been omitted from the list, either through oversight or because they were not thought to be covered by Annex 3, in the next update, which is to be submitted in July 1993.

7. Review of the Iraqi list revealed that the Iraqi authorities had not conformed with the condition identified in 5.e. and 5.f. above. For example, a large number of machine tools inventoried by the Agency in the course of inspections had not been included in the list. During the Eighteenth Inspection mission, 242 additional machine tools were found, a large number of which, in the opinion of the IAEA team, should have been included in the declaration of Iraq under Annex 3. The machine tools have been identified and their present conditions are being evaluated to determine which items may fall outside the specifications set out in Annex 3.

RADIOMETRIC HYDROLOGIC SURVEY

8. The first sampling campaign of Iraqi waterways, begun during the Fourteenth Inspection (31 August - 7 September 1992), was concluded during the Fifteenth Inspection (8 - 18 November 1992). 52 sites throughout Iraq were sampled. The objective of the survey of surface waters are detection and characterization: the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities, and the establishment of a baseline for the longer term monitoring programme.

9. As of the time of this report, final conclusions and recommendations await evaluation of the sample analysis data. However, the current planning for the long term monitoring regime contemplates ongoing hydrologic sampling at key monitoring sites with spot checks at other locations. In terms of logistics, sampling locations in the Kurdish area north and northeast of Mosul gave rise to some difficulties which could require reconsideration of such locations for the purposes of sample taking.

PERIODIC INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

10. A number of short-notice and no-notice inspections were carried out in the last six-month period. In the course of one such inspection during the Sixteenth Inspection, which took place at the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) complex (the former PC-3 Headquarters), a series of events involving failure by Iraq to ensure immediate and unrestricted access to all records which the IAEA and the Special Commission wish to inspect and interference with the right of the IAEA and the Commission to copy records, data and information, took place. These actions amounted to violations by Iraq of the rights of the IAEA and the Special Commission under the Security Council resolutions, the plans approved thereunder, and the Status Arrangements of 14 May 1991. The details of these violations were reported to the Security Council in document S/25013 (24 December 1992). Letters from the Director General of the IAEA and from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission protesting these violations were sent to the Iraqi authorities.

11. During the Eighteenth IAEA Inspection, a visit was made for the first time to the Saddam University in Baghdad, without prior notice. The Iraqi side initially attempted to seriously restrict the access of the inspection team, but subsequently modified its position. The inspection was conducted by six of the IAEA inspectors, subject to the condition that the seven remaining members of the IAEA team could join the six if any proscribed activity or equipment were found on the premises. No such activity or equipment was found.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL BALANCE

12. Of immediate concern is the recent uncovering of major inconsistencies between the Iraqi declarations concerning nuclear material and the IAEA's analytical results of samples.

Specifically, it appears that the Iraqi authorities may have mischaracterized the origin of certain nuclear material and understated the amounts of material produced and processed in different locations in Iraq or imported from abroad. This gives rise to serious questions about the inventory of nuclear material in Iraq. Iraqi authorities acknowledge the analytical inconsistencies, but have thus far failed to explain the reasons for such inconsistencies and have refused to discuss the matter any further.

In the absence of further clarification by Iraq on this matter, the IAEA must express strong reservations about the completeness of the Iraqi declarations concerning the presence and use of nuclear material.

EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS

13. Meetings have been held with the Iraqi side to examine the practical arrangements and inspection activities necessary for monitoring the use of various machine tools and other equipment and materials. The Iraqi authorities acknowledged their acceptance of random, short-notice inspections, their willingness to consolidate equipment at a small number of sites to ease the monitoring problem for both sides, their acceptance of the inspection team's right to take samples and to verify the inventory of produced items, and their willingness to create and maintain a system of records and logbooks and to declare in advance and to continuously document the use of monitored equipment.

ENRICHMENT PROGRAMME

14. During the Fifteenth Inspection, the Agency team was able to interview a number of senior scientists and engineers who had been involved in the Iraqi centrifuge programme. These

included individuals who identified themselves as the technical director of the centrifuge programme; a technical advisor on design, manufacturing, material testing and training; a specialist in rotor dynamics who served as a consultant on the mechanical design of rotating components; a material scientist with responsibility in the centrifuge programme for material selection and testing, surface treatment, heat treatment, welding technology and flow forming; and two process engineers with responsibility for process development for UF6 production and design and operation of centrifuge process testing.

15. The Iraqi authorities acknowledged for the first time a connection between the centrifuge programme and the Rashdiya Engineering Design Centre. However, they insisted that other than computer modelling, no experimentation involving hardware in support of centrifuge design ever occurred or was planned to take place at Rashdiya. While this positive development must be acknowledged, the fact remains that, for over a year, the Iraqi authorities had persistently denied any involvement of the Centre at Rashdiya in the centrifuge development programme.

PROCUREMENT-RELATED INFORMATION

16. During the Fifteenth Inspection, the Iraqi authorities reiterated the Iraqi Government's refusal to provide information regarding specific procurements and procurement networks. This position seemed to have been slightly modified during the Sixteenth Inspection, at which time the Iraqi Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research and present Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Committee, Dr. Human Abdel Khaliq Ghaffour, informed the IAEA team that the Iraqi authorities would "deal positively" with inquiries from the IAEA regarding the procurement of equipment and materials for the Iraqi nuclear programme. However, follow-

up written requests by the IAEA for such information failed to produce positive responses from Iraq.

17. In the course of the Seventeenth Inspection, the issue was raised again. Although the Iraqi authorities indicated that it was their intention to provide the missing information, they requested a consolidated list of outstanding questions on procurement by the IAEA and the Special Commission, and that such list should only refer to items related to resolution 687. This procedure was objected to by the Chief Inspector, as experience has demonstrated that such an approach produced little information, and, in fact, only generated more questions.

18. The Eighteenth Inspection team did request, once again, in writing, detailed information about foreign procurement and the Iraqi procurement network. The information requested included that related to the procurement of all equipment, components and raw material listed in Annex 3 which were used or intended for use in nuclear-related research, development and production; manufacturers' names; and names of intermediate suppliers and other companies in the procurement chain. Information on companies and individuals which had provided technical advice on procurement, utilization and design information was also requested. As a matter of priority, the Iraqi authorities were requested to provide, as a demonstration of forthcomingness, answers relevant to the procurement of maraging steel, which had been requested in writing in December 1992.

The Iraqi authorities once again refused to provide the information requested, calling the questions too general and aimed at maintaining the conditions for the embargo.

REMOVAL OF IRRADIATED NUCLEAR FUEL ASSEMBLIES

19. Negotiations with the Committee of International Relations on behalf of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (CIR Minatom) for the removal, processing and sale or storage of the remaining irradiated nuclear material in Iraq are approaching conclusion. It is anticipated the removal operation will be completed by the end of 1993.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

20. The Iraqi Government persists in its refusal to provide the IAEA with information related to foreign procurement and procurement network, in particular as it relates to the Iraqi enrichment programme.

21. Renewed resistance by the Iraqi authorities to providing clarification as to the nuclear material declarations makes impossible a conclusion by the IAEA that all such material has been declared and presented to the IAEA.

22. The shortcomings indicated in paragraphs 20 and 21 above and the continuing discovery of additional material and items which should have been declared by Iraq, but which had not been, prevent the establishment of a technical basis for implementing effectively the long term monitoring of Iraqi activities as foreseen in resolution 715.

23. The problems identified above are compounded by the refusal of the Iraqi Government to formally recognize its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715

(1991). Iraq has not yet even formally complied with the requirement laid down in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), that it accepts the Plan prepared by the Agency and approved by the Security Council.

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S/25622
17 April 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 17 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to request an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25623
17 April 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 17 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF CAPE VERDE, DJIBOUTI, MOROCCO, PAKISTAN AND OF VENEZUELA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We, the non-aligned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the city of Srebrenica, and to take action on draft resolution S/25558, since the conditions that justified the adoption of resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993 have not been met.

(Signed) José Luis JESUS
Permanent Representative of
Cape Verde to the United Nations

(Signed) Roble OLHAYE
Permanent Representative of
Djibouti to the United Nations

(Signed) Ahmed SNOUSSI
Permanent Representative of
Morocco to the United Nations

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
Permanent Representative of
Pakistan to the United Nations

(Signed) Diego ARRIA
Permanent Representative of
Venezuela to the United Nations

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25624
19 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Acting under paragraph 5 of resolution 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992 and paragraph 1 of resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992, where the Security Council "calls upon States ... to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and make this information available to the Council", I have the honour to present to you the attached letter from Mr. Sulejman Suljic, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a transcript of a telephone conversation between General Mladic, Commander of the Serb and Montenegrin aggressor forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his subordinates, Colonel Balac and Captain Kraljevic.

May I ask for your kind assistance in having this letter and its attachments available to the Commission of Experts established pursuant to resolution 780 (1992), and having them circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 17 April 1993 from the Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina in New York

Despite the Security Council resolution adopted late last night (16 April 1993) European time, which creates prerequisites for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to take over control over the security of the civilian population of Srebrenica and thus stop the aggression against it, we have to send the following report from Srebrenica, dated 17 April 1993 at 1.15 p.m., sent to us by radio amateurs:

"The town has been shelled throughout the night, the attacks escalating since 6 a.m. in particular. A great number of casualties are lying in the streets and in the shelled buildings without a possibility to be helped because the shelling continues incessantly. The infantry attacks are the fiercest from the directions of Zeleni Jadar, Pribicevac and Kvaro. The aggressor has been trying, in every possible way, to break into the town. The aggressor artillery, multibarrel-rocket launchers from Serbia included, are showering the town. It is a true inferno in Srebrenica, dozens of the wounded are dying, because they cannot be given medical assistance.

"1.20 p.m. - The building accommodating UNPROFOR has also been shelled."

(Signed) Sulejman SULJIC
Under-Secretary

Enclosure

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ministry of Information

Transcript of the telephone conversation between General Mladic, Colonel Balac and Captain Kraljevic recorded on Friday, 16 April 1993.

Mladic: Hello, Colonel Balac.
Balac: Yes, hello, hello, boss ...
M: Yes.
B: Balac here, tell me.
M: I am drinking coffee on Sarampovo and watching this sheepfold down there lying as if it were on my palm.
B: What are you drinking? Coffee?
M: On Sarampovo ...
B: I am being recorded for history.
M: Mr. Colonel, Sir, congratulations.
B: Thanks, boss.
M: Where are those ...? I am watching this sheepfold as if it were laid on my palm.
B: Sheepfold as if were on your palm?
M: Can you have them? (Mladic laughs.)
B: They are crawling down there like ants.
M: Like ants?
B: Yes.
M: Let the sniper work. So, they are crawling like ants. The best sniper is at work.
B: This afternoon they'll work non-stop.
M: Let them work.
B: But we'll be choosy.
M: What?
B: We'll be choosy, brother.
M: Let only the last convoy get out.
B: Understood, boss. You'll give a signal when to cut them off. (Mladic laughs.) Excellent.
B: Yes, Sir.
M: You'll contact me, let the convoy out.
B: Yes, Sir. Our extension is 311.
M: What is your extension? 311?
B: Yes, mine.
M: Congratulations, 311.
B: Yes, but we have got here the troops from the south.
M: You've got an extension. (Laughter.) What about Zeleni Jadar, tell me about it?
B: Boss, we are watching down below. Lukcem is climbing up there and watching it below him.
M: Let him climb and let him watch it, tell him so. So, go on like that, go on tearing them up and don't stop.
B: Understood.
M: Don't touch the town for the time being.

B: Yes, Sir.
M: Congratulations. I couldn't admire you more.
B: Thanks, boss.
M: What a [expletive deleted] you have got. (Balac laughs.)
M: Superb job. (Both Mladic and Balac laugh.)
M: Just go on like that.
B: Understand.
M: Bye.
B: Bye.

Hello.
Hello.
Mladic: Get me Balac on the line. Immediately.
M: Hello, Rajko. Rajko, boss is on the line.
M: Wait a sec. Give me Balac.
Balac: Yes.
M: Fire at Zeleni Jadar, you have my permission.
B: Yes, Sir.
M: Get the [expletive deleted].
B: If you allow, we'll start right away.
M: Shoot at Zeleni Jadar. Don't touch the factory, we need the machines.
B: Yes, Sir.
M: Zeleni Jadar. Fire a platoon right away.
B: Understood.
M: Don't let them breathe. You have good communication with our (unreadable) so that you don't get them.
B: Don't you worry.
M: Get going, brother, but don't fight the main town over there.
B: Don't worry.
M: Shell as much as you wish, boss. Bye.
B: Bye.
M: Fire at human flesh only.
Mladic: Do it safely and shrewdly and don't, they, fool you around in the wood, take care these are the (unreadable), they are there in those woods, not in these over here.
Kraljevic: Yes, Sir.
M: Clear?
K: Yes, Sir.
M: Well, there you are. Don't shell Srebrenica, for the rest, just go on.
K: Understood. We have the batteries up there, we shelled Pribicevac.
M: It doesn't matter. Only the human flesh, don't do anything but shell the human flesh.
K: Understood.
M: Avoid their hills, they have not got any weapons, nothing lethal, just a couple of bazookas. They have rifles. The simple ones. The 300-metres range, that's all. Avoid the hill, cut their communication, there is neither water nor electricity on the hill.
K: Understood.

M: Neither food nor anything. Just advance in their depth. Cut them through.

K: Understood.

M: Use the smaller group, and don't stop, brother.

K: Yes, yes.

M: Regards to all, and push on.

Sarajevo, 17 April 1993

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/25625
19 April 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 19 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that, following the statement by the President of the Security Council of 6 April 1993 (S/25539) on "the deterioration of relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan", according to which the Security Council demanded "the immediate cessation of all such hostilities, which endanger peace and security in the region, and the withdrawal of these forces", the Republic of Armenia is blatantly ignoring this statement. The Armenian armed forces are continuing their large-scale aggression in the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic.

According to information from the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan, the attacks by the Armenian National Army on various districts of Azerbaijan began immediately after Armenia's occupation of the town of Kelbajar.

The Armenian air force is subjecting settlements in the Agdam and Fizuli districts of Azerbaijan to continuous bombing.

The raids by Armenian air force SU-25 low-flying aircraft and the massive artillery shelling of the town of Fizuli led to the complete destruction of a number of residential buildings. Some 200 missiles and rockets fell on the town. Casualties were avoided because much of the population of 20,000 had been evacuated.

Advance units of Armenian armed formations are currently situated within two to three kilometres of the town. The capture of the town of Fizuli, as we pointed out in our letter of 12 April 1993 to the President of the Security Council (S/25582), poses a threat to four districts in south-western Azerbaijan having a population of over 200,000 people.

Meanwhile, sub-units of regular units of the Armenian armed forces, supported by armoured vehicles, have made an incursion across the northern sector of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border into the Geranboy district of Azerbaijan, coming close to the village of Gyulistan in that district.

The Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan also reports of attacks by Armenian sub-units from the territory of the Idzhevan district of Armenia on border villages in the Akstafa district of Azerbaijan.

As a result of the ongoing invasion of Azerbaijani territory by the Armenian armed forces, hundreds of peaceful citizens are being killed, thousands of people are being left homeless and new refugees have appeared.

Armenia's territorial ambitions and its persistent desire to expand its own lands at Azerbaijan's expense pose a major threat to peace and security throughout the Transcaucasian region.

We call upon the Security Council to take all necessary measures to restrain the overzealous aggressor and condemn Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25626
19 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARMENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

It is out of deep concern that I am compelled to inform you of the latest round of military developments that have taken place surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. What is most disturbing about these latest developments is that Azerbaijan has spread its scope of military activity by violating the State border of Armenia in directing several attacks towards frontier villages that are on the Armenian side. Clearly, these are attempts to draw Armenia into the armed confrontation.

The details of the latest military escalation according to information received by the Mission of Armenia from Armenia's Foreign Ministry on 17 April 1993 are as follows:

Starting on the evening of 31 March, Azerbaijani forces mounted a massive military offensive. Heavy bombardment and rocket shelling coming from Fizuli into the Hadrut region of Nagorno-Karabakh left extensive human casualties and material destruction in the regional centre of Hadrut. The nearby village of Dudukchi was also affected by this assault. During the night of 30-31 March, heavy artillery shelling took place in the Taush, Krasnoselsk and Ijevan regions of the Republic of Armenia.

During the night of 1 April, the Shekher and Karmir Shuka villages of the Martakert region and the Dudukchi and Edilu villages of the Hadrut region of Nagorno-Karabakh were subjected to continuous rocket and artillery fire.

From 2 through 4 April, Armenian border areas as well as the eastern borders of the Martakert, Martuni and Hadrut regions of Nagorno-Karabakh were subjected to heavy artillery shelling.

On 5 April, detachments of the Azerbaijani army, in violation of the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh, staged a major assault in the direction of Togh village in the region of Hadrut. Heavy rocket and artillery bombing was being carried out in two separate theatres· from the south into the regional centre of Hadrut and the village of Edilu, as well as from the north towards the direction of Nerkin Horatagh in the Martakert region. On that same day, at 1630 hours, an Azerbaijani jet fighter dropped cassette bombs over the regional centre of Martuni, inflicting heavy casualties. At the same time, attacks and

shelling from the south onto the Lachin humanitarian corridor continued to disrupt the function of the corridor.

Through spreading misinformation to the effect that the Nagorno-Karabkah detachments are attempting to seize Fizuli, Azerbaijan wishes to cover up its policy of aggressive actions aimed at solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by the use of force. The Chief of Staff of the Nagorno-Karabakh Self-Defence Forces, Serge Sargsian, has categorically denied these allegations by Azerbaijan.

On the night of 6 April, the regions of Taush, Ijevan and Noyemberian of the Republic of Armenia were subjected to artillery fire. It has been detected that considerable detachments of Azerbaijani infantry and heavy military machinery have been amassed just outside of the Taush region's border. The build-up of Azerbaijani troops in the Kubatly region of Azerbaijan has also been reported.

Renewed attacks by Azerbaijani troops on the Lachin humanitarian corridor from the south were intercepted by the Nagorno-Karabakh Self-Defence Forces. The Azerbaijani troops receded to their previous positions. Tensions remained high during the entire day of 6 April in the region of Kelbajar, where Azerbaijani attacks were continuing from the north. Rocket and artillery shelling from the direction of Fizuli into the Hadrut region were continuous.

On 7 April, the Azerbaijani forces began a new offensive in the direction of the Martuni regional centre. On that same day at 1520 hours, an Azerbaijani MIG 21 jet fighter released three bombs over the civilian-populated areas of Martuni, causing extensive casualties.

During the night of 7 April, large detachments of the Azerbaijani army staged a major offensive from their military base in the Aghdam region towards the centre of the Martuni region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Self-Defence Forces of Nagorno-Karabakh deterred the attack.

Defensive operations were carried out in the Martakert region's village of Nerkin Horatagh throughout the night. The very next day, the Azerbaijani offensive was put down.

On the night of 7 April, the border villages of the Hadrut region of Nagorno-Karabakh were again subjected to heavy shelling from the direction of Fizuli.

During the evening of 6 April and the night of 7 April, the villages of the Kapan region were shelled. The Taush region and the Vazashen village of the Ijevan region were also subjected to shelling. These regions lie within the State border of Armenia. A build-up of units of Azerbaijani infantry and heavy machinery have been detected near Taush on the Azerbaijani side.

On 8 April, the Nagorno-Karabakh Self-Defence Forces drove back a large-scale offensive that was staged from the north in the direction of the Martakert region's Metsshen and Maghavus villages. At the same time, the Hadrut border villages in the south were subjected to heavy shelling and artillery fire by Azerbaijani forces from the direction on Fizuli.

On 10 April, in flagrant violation of the borders of Armenia, Azerbaijani forces captured the villages of Srashen and Nerkin Hand in the Kapan region of the Republic of Armenia. Azerbaijani tanks entered the aforementioned villages and caused extensive material destruction and human casualties. Looting and pillaging were also reported. On 11 April, the Azerbaijani forces were driven out of those villages. At the same time, several other villages in the Kapan region were subjected to shelling. Extensive Azerbaijani detachments have been amassed along the borders of the regions of Sisian and Taush, with a view to staging renewed offensives in those regions. The regions of Sisian and Taush are also within Armenia's State borders.

During the evening of 12 April, the Hadrut regional centre of Nagorno-Karabakh was subjected to heavy artillery shelling from Azerbaijani military bases in Fizuli, causing significant destruction. Concurrently, the village of Tegh in the Goris region of Armenia was subjected to heavy shelling from the direction of Azerbaijani territory, as well as the village of Berkaber in the Ijevan region of the Republic of Armenia. Casualties were reported. Azerbaijani military forces mounted repeated attempts to cross over the border into the territory of the Kapan district of Armenia, as the incessant shelling of nearby villages continued.

During the night of 12 April, the Azerbaijani forces attempted to occupy the Hadrut region's Armenian-populated village of Hin Taghlar. Concurrently, a massive shelling campaign was staged in the direction of the town centre of Hadrut. Major casualties were inflicted. Azerbaijani troops retreated the next morning.

Also during the night of 12 April, the eastern parts of Martakert region and the area of the Lachin humanitarian corridor were subjected to repeated assaults. The renewed attacks on the humanitarian corridor came from the Azerbaijani military base at Kubatly. Azerbaijani forces again mounted attacks on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border areas.

Heavy shelling took place in the village of Movses in Armenia's Taush region in the north on 13 April. The Lachin humanitarian corridor was also shelled repeatedly from the south.

During the early morning hours of 14 April, the villages in the Kapan region of the Republic of Armenia were once again subjected to heavy shelling. The significant accumulation of Azerbaijani armed forces continues close to the Kapan regional limits. On the morning of 14 April, Azerbaijani forces launched a new ground offensive against Martuni in Nagorno-Karabakh. This attack was repelled by the Nagorno-Karabakh Self-Defence Forces. Casualties were reported.

During the afternoon of 14 April, an Azerbaijani army detachment that was stationed in Fizuli attempted to mount another offensive in the direction of the Nagorno-Karabakh village of Edilu, in the Hadrut region. This offensive was accompanied by missile attacks and was intensified by the use of armoured vehicles. By the end of the day, this offensive was stopped. Casualties were reported by the Nagorno-Karabakh side. The accumulation of significant amounts of Azerbaijani armed forces and heavy weaponry was detected in the Azerbaijani regions of Tovuz, Getabek and Akstafa. Due to a hazardous situation, Armenian farmers in the nearby bordering areas have stopped farming on the fields. On

14 April, the Armenian village of Barekamavan in the Noyemberian region of the Republic of Armenia was subjected to artillery shelling.

On 15 April, the regional centre of Hadrut of Nagorno-Karabakh was subjected to an Azerbaijani military offensive, with heavy shelling coming from Fizuli. Casualties have been reported.

Following several unfriendly statements by Turkish leaders in regard to the recent events in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey has undertaken some practical actions: According to "Radio of Russia" which referred to the Turkish newspaper Hurriet, the first shipment of weapons has been delivered from Turkey to Azerbaijan. Erdal Inonu warned that the capacity of the military provisions can be increased. Turkey has started transporting servicemen disguised in civilian clothes to Nakhichevan and has completely cut off the flow of humanitarian shipments destined for Armenia. In addition, beginning on 13 April, Turkish authorities created obstacles for 500 Armenian tourists, forcing them to alter their itinerary and to return home. The group was hindered in Kars and was prevented from boarding a train going back to Armenia. The tourists are still not reported to have arrived in Batumi by sea as expected. For now, there is still no information about the location of the group.

In the morning of 16 April, Armenian villages along the border areas of Nagorno-Karabakh's Hadrut region were subjected to heavy artillery fire. At the same time, the Azerbaijani military units launched an attack on the Armenian village of Hin Taglar in the same region. These attacks were launched from Azerbaijani military bases in the region of Djebrail. Accumulations of Azerbaijani military equipment continue to be detected on the border with Nagorno-Karabakh's Hadrut region.

Also on 16 April, the village of Nerkin Karmiraghpiur in the Taush region of the Republic of Armenia was subjected to severe artillery fire. There were wounded people among the civilian population.

In accordance with the latest initiative of Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the military commanders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Self-Defence Forces have issued a unilateral order to interrupt immediately the military activities along the line of confrontation with the Azerbaijani army. The authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh have expressed their readiness to give independent observers an opportunity to see with their own eyes the serious intentions of Nagorno-Karabakh to achieve a cease-fire.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alexander ARZOUMANIAN
Permanent Representative